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SPAULDING 'V. CAMERON
(38 C.2d 265: 239 P.2d 625J
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MRS. SUMNER SPAULDING, Respondent, v. ARTHUR
A. CAMERON, Appellant.
[1] Waters-Surface and Flood Waters-Protection AgainstEvidence.-A finding that inundations of plnintilf's pl'OPl!l·ty
with mud were caused by defendant's negligence in eonstl'Ucting a fill is sustained by evidence that he t'aih'd to use the
proper procedure for making stable fills although warned of
the hazard he was thereby creating.
[2] Id.-Nuisances.-A negligently constructed fill causing plaintiff's property to be inundated with mud and threatening
repetitions thereof which, unless corrected, would compel her
to abandon her residence thereon, constitutes II lluisan!'e within
Civ. Code, § 3479.
[3] Nuisances-Remedies-Review.-In an action to abate II nuisance and for damages, in which the court makes an express
finding of permanent damage to plaintiff's property based 011
the continuing threat of future injury, but also makes an
inconsistent implied finding that the threat clln be removed,
and where it <'annot be said as a matter of law whether or
not it can, the appdlate court will affirm that part of 1I
judgment awarding damages for actual physieal injury, but
will reverse that part granting injunctive relief Ilnd awarding additional dall\ages for loss in market v:tlue by 1'eaSOIi
of the continuing threat, and will direct the trial (:ourt to
determine whether the lluisance is permanent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Otto J. Emme, .Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part with instructions.
Action for damages and for injunctive relief. Judgment
for plaintiff affirmed in part and reversed in part.
~lartin H. Easton, James A. Gardner, Overton, Lyman,
Prince & Vermille and Donald H. Ford for Appellant.

Samuel A. Rosenthal, Prinzmetal & Grant and Leonard
G. Ratner for Respondent.
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[2] See Cal. Jur., Waters, § 275; Am.Jur., Waters, § 432.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 411; [2] Waters, § 2i 5 :
[3] Nuisances, § 64.
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TBA YXOH, .I.--l'laintiff owns and occupies a hOllse on
sidc of San Ysidro Drive, Los Angeles, at the bottom of Pea Villc Canyon. Defendant owns approximately 30
aeres of land Oil the west slope of the canyon. In the sumIller and fall of 1946 defendant undertook leveling operations un his property. These operations consisted of removing the tops of three knolls and casting the earth over the
sidl's of adjoining canyons, forming fills. Approximately
one fifth of the earth was pushed over the west side of the
Pea Vine Canyon northwest of plaintiff's house. In November of 1946 as a result of heavy rains large quantities of
Illud washed out of defendant's fill, flowed down the canyon,
surrounded plaintiff's house and inundated the garages located on the ground level. Plaintiff brought this action for
damages and for injunctive relief. 'fhe trial court found
t hat plaintiff's property had suffered physical damage in
the amount of $2,732.29, and that its market value had been
reduced in the amount of $24,000 because of the continuing
threat of future inundations of mud. It entered judgment
for damages for both items and also ordered defendant either
to remove the fill or to "place protective structures around
. . . lit 1 in such manner that the property of the plaintiff
will not be endangered or threatened by the existence of
~i\ldl deposits of loose dirt."
Defendant appeals.
1t is unnecessary to decide whether in the absence of neglig-cnee defendant would be liable for creating on his propl'l·ty an earth fill that presented a continuing threat of injlll'Y to the property below. [1] There is evidence that
ill making the fill defendant did not prepare the natural
hillside to hold the dirt he deposited thereon, nor did he
make use of available means to compact the earth as it was
laid down to prevent it from washing away. Experts testitipd that proper procedures for making stable fills were not
el\lployed. Moreover, defendant was warned during the
"ollI'Sl' of the leveling operations of the hazard being created to the property below. Accordingly, the evidence is
suftit·ient to support the finding that the inundation of plaintiff's property was caused by defendant's negligence in constructing the fill. There is also sufficient evidence to support the finding that the fill constitutes a threat of repetitions of sue-h inundations and will, unless corrected, compel
plaintiff to abandon her residence.
[2] On the basis of the foregoing findings it is clear that
defendant's fill constitutes a nuisance. (Civ. Code, § 3479;
t hl' ell::;t
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Kaicnkal1lp v. ellion Realty Co., 6 Ca1.2d 765, 774, 776 r5!}
P.2d 473] ; Jlclvor v. ]ICI'cc/,-Fraser Co., 76 Cal.App.2d 247.
:!54 1172 P.2d 758].) Defendant contends, however, that
the trial court et'red in allowing damages for the decline in
market value of plaintiff's property in addition to damages
for the physical injury, particularly in view of the fact tliat
it ordered the abatement of the nuisance, the continuation
of which is the cause of the decrease in the market value.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that there is in reality
no way in which defendant can abate the nuisance and that
it was therefore proper for the trial court to award damages
caused by the continuing threat of future injury.
In early decisions of this court it ,vas held that it should
not be presumed that a nuisance would continue, and damages
wcre not allowed for a decrease in market value caused by
the existence of the nuisance but were limited to the actnal
physical injury suffered before the commencement of the
action. (Ilopkins v. lVestern Pac. B. Co., 50 Cal. 190, ] 94;
Set'ery v. Central Pac. B. Co., 51 Cal. 194, 197; see, also,
Coats v. Atchison T. & S. F. B. Co., 1 Cal.App. 441, 444·445
[82 P. 640].) The remedy for a continuing nuisance was
either a suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for
damages as new injuries occurred. Situations arose, howeyer, where injunctive relief was not appropriate or ,vhere
successive actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff
or the defendant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized
that some types of nuisances should be considered pprma·
lIcnt, and in such cases recovery of past and anticipated
future damages were allowed in one action. (Eaclws v. L().~
Angcles Consolo Elec. By. Co., 103 Cal. 614. 622 [37 P. 750,
42 Am.St.Rep. 149] ; Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., 150 Cal.
624, 626-628 [89 P. 599]; Rankin v. DeBare, 205 Cal. 639,
641 1271 P. 1050] ; see McCormick on Damages, § 127, pp.
504.505.)
The clcarest case of a permanent nuisance or trer-::par-::s is
the onc wherc the offending struetm'e or condition is maintained as a necessary part of the operations of a publie
utility. Since such conditions are ordinarily of indefinite durution and since the utility by making compensation
is entitled to continue them, it is appropriate that only
line aetillll sllOuld be allowed to recover for all the damages
inflicted. It would be unfair to the utility to subject it to
successive suits and unfair to the injured party if he were
not allowed to recover all of his probable damagps at once.

268

I

SPAULDING V. CAMERON

(38 C.2d

. (See McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land,
3i Harv.L.Rev. 574, 584-585.)
A more difficult problem is presented, however, if the defendant is not privileged to continue the nuisance or trespass
but its abatement is impractical or the plaintiff is willing
that it continue if he can secure full compensation for both
past and anticipated future injuries. To attempt categorically to classify such a nuisance as either permanent or not
may lead to serious injustice to one or the other of the parties. Thus, if the plaintiff assumes it is not permanent and
sues only for past damages, he may be met with the plea
of res jUdicata in a later action for additional injury if the
('ourt then decides the nuisance was permanent in character
from its inception. (See Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 58 Cal.App.2d
864, 870 (137 P.2d 713].) Similarly, if the initial injury
is slight and plaintiff delays suit until he has suffered substantial damage and the court then determines that the nuisance was permanent, the defendant may be able to raise
the defense that the statute of limitations ran from the tim('
of the initial injury. (See Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27
Cal.2d 104, 107-108 (162 P.2d 625].) On the other hand,
jf the defendant is willing and able to abate the nuisanc(',
it is unfair to award damages on the theory that it will
continue. (See Meek v. De Latour, 2 Cal.App. 261, 265 [83
P. 300] ; ct., Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal. 554, 566
(2 P.2d 790] ; Colorado P. Co. v. Pacific G. & E. Co., 218 Cal.
55!), 567 [24 P.2d 495].)
.
Because of these difficulties it has been recognized that
in doubtful cases the plaintiff should have an election to
treat the nuisance as either permanent or not. (Kafka v.
BOZ1:0, 191 Cal. 746, 752 (218 P. 753, 29 A.L.R. 833]; see
Restatement, Torts, § 930; McCormick on Damages, § 127,
p. 511 et seq.; 4 Sutherland on Damages [4th ed.] § 1046,
p. 3874.) If the defendant is not privileged to continue
the nuisance and is able to abate it, he cannot complain
if the plaintiff elects to bring successive actions as damages accrue until abatement takes place. (Phillips v. City
of Pa..~adena, 27 Ca1.2d 104, 107-108 (162 P.2d 625] ; Stronrl
v. Sullivan, 180 Cal. 331, 334-335 [181 P. 59, 4 A.L.R.
343].) On the other hand, if it appears improbable as a
practical matter that the nuisance can or will be abated,
the plaintiff should not be left to the troublesome remedy
of successive actions. (See Restatement, Torts, § 930, com-
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ment c; McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Illjury to
Land, 37 Han'.TJ,ReY. 5i4. 594-595.)
The facts of the present case aptly illustrate the problem
involved. As a result of the nuisance created by defendant,
plaintiff's property suffered physical h;;:;ury. There is also
evidence that while the lluisance continues its rental value
is impaired, and that if the nuisance is not abated its market
value will continue to be substantially depressed. There is
evidence that would support the conclusion that there is
little or nothing defendant can do to abate the nuisance. On
the assumption that this conclusion is correct, plaintiff contends that she is entitled to recover the full diminution in
the market value caused by the probable continuation of the
nuisance. On the other hand, defendant contends that he
can and will abate the nuisance. There is evidence that
would support the conclusion that corrective measures taken
by defendant will prevent further flows of mud. Moreover,
since defendant intends to make use of the top surface of
the fill it is not improbable that he will do whatever is practically possible to stabilize it. On the assumption that he
has or will be able to abate the nuisance defendant contends
that plaintiff's damages should be limited to those suffered
in the past and should not include speculative future losses
based on the assumption that the nuisance win continue.
[3] The findings and conclusions of the trial court on
these conflicting contentions are inconsistent. The court
found that plaintiff's property had been permanently damaged because of the continuing threat of future injury. It
also found, however, that this threat would continue unless
corrective measures were taken, and by ordering that such
measures be taken impliedly found that they ,vere feasible.
It is clear that plaintiff cannot have both remedies. If defendant obeys the injunction and takes such measures that
., the property of the plaintiff will not be endangered or
threatened by the existence of such deposits of loose dirt,"
there will no longer be a threat to depreciate the value of
the property. Plaintiff would obtain a double recovery if
she could recover for the depreciation in value and also
lIa vc the cause of that depreciation removed .
. A similar problem was presented in Meek v. De Latour, 2
Cal.App. 261 [83 P. 300]. In that case plaintiff secured
a judgment ordering the abatement of a cream of tartar
factory and awarding damages. In compliance with the
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jlldg'lllPut thl' fal'tOl'Y was l'PIlH)Vp(L ana 011 app<'al it was
lIPid that ('vidl'llc'(' 01' the (\cel'N1SC in Jluu'kl't "aluc caused
by its prl'sencc was inadmissible. "It seelUs perfectly clear
thllt such testimony ... , where the abatement of a nuisance
is sought, is inadmissible 011 the qnestion of damages. Otherwisl' a plaintiff could reeover for the depreciation in value
of his property and at the same time remove the depreciation by abating the canse of it." (2 Cal.App. at 265.)
In th<' present case it cannot be said as a matter of law
that the nuisance can or cannot be abated. In view of
the inconsistent findings and the conflict in the evidence,
it would be inappropriate for this court to determine whether
the nuisance is in fact permanent and to modify the judg.
ment by striking the damages for loss of market value on
the assumption it is not permanent, or by striking the injunctive provisions on the assumption that it is. (Tupman
Y. IIabel'kern, 208 Cal. 256, 269-270 [280 P. 970].)
Since plaintiff has proved defendant's liability for the
actual physical injmy to the property the judgment should
bl> affirmed to the extent that it awards $2,732.29 dam·
ages for that injury. 'ro the extent that the judgment
uwards additional damages and also grants injunctive reo
lief it must be reversed. On retrial the trial court should
dete!'mine whether or not the nuisance is in fact permanent.
1f it finds that it is, it should enter judgment for the del'!'ease in market value. If it finds that it is not, it should
g'l'llllt injunctive relief and such additional damages as may
bl' pl'o\'ed for the temporary decrease in the value of the
use of the property while the nuisance continued. (See
Bou.rdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp., 48 Cal.App.2d 429, 4374:18 [119 P.2d 973] ; Gltttingcr v. Calave1'Os Cement Co., 105
Cal.App.2d 382,387 [233 P.2d 914] ; :McCormick on Damages,
§ 127. pp. 503-504.)
To the extent that it awards damag<'s of $2,732.29 the
judgment is affiruwd. III all otllE'r respects the judgment
is 1'(>\'l'l's('ll and the l'anse is remandell to the trial court with
illstl'lldions todetel'lIIine Oil the basis of the evidence previ.
ollsly p!'esented ana sueh additional evidence as may be pre·
s('lltf'd b~' the pal·ties whether or not the nuisance is in fact
]W!·IlHI11f'nt. Bach party is to hf'ar his own l'osts on this appeal.
/
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Gibson. C. J .. Shenk .•J., Edmonds. J .. Schauer, J" and
Spence ••r., conem"l·ed.
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J.-I dissent.
1 alll of the opinion that the portion of the judgment for
damages should be affil'med and the injuneth'e feature either
anH'ndrd or affil'llled as correctly construed,
In this easc the defemlant negligently llIaintailled loose
dirt on his land which has in the past, when it rained. mOY(',l
onto plaintiff's land. The court expressly found that surh
('OlHlition rxisting on defendant's land permanently drpret'iated tht' market yalue of plaintiff's land as follows: " ...
b~' reason of the acts of the defendant .. , plaintiff's proprrty has !mfferpd a substantial and permanent impairment of
yalue and has lo.~t its desirability as a residence for plaintiff. 01' any prospeetiye purchasers; that it is true that the
fair market yalue of the house on plaintiff's property brfore the deposit of the loose dirt, Rnd the damage occa ...ioned
thcreby. was the sum of $40,000.00, and that the fair resale yalnc of said house after the damage caused b~' the
d!'fendant . , , was the sum of $16,000.00, to plaintiff's dC'h'iment and damage ill the sum of $24,000.00, and it is true
that the maintenanre by the defendant . . . of the loose
quantities of dirt on his premises will cause plaintiff great
and irreparable injury and will permanently deprive plaintiff's lalhl of allY yalne for residential purposes." (Italie!';
added.) It is conceded by the majority that that fillrling is
snpported by the evidence. The majority opinion sa~-s. ho\\,ewi', that there is an ineollsistent finding to the effect that
the ('onditioll on defrndant's land is not permanent-('an
be abated. There is no e:rpress finding to that effect. .\ssUlning there is an implied finding flowing from the fact
that an injunction was given, then the duty of this court
is to lib!'rally eonstrne the findings to support the part of
the jlldgment based upon snch findings, rather than rewrsillg thc entire jUdgment. Thus the implied inconsistent
fhHling that the eondition can be abated may be ignorcrl.
81Hl the pal't of the judgment awarding injunctin~ l'f'lif'f
n'\·C'I'sed. ",hill' affirming the (lamage portion which is basf'rl
on an e.rpre.~.~ finding of pcrmanent damage. In line with
the sett\e(l rule that findings must be liberally construed to
support the judgment and specific findings control oyer general 0lW8 (24 CaLTnr. 1007 et seq.) an exprcss finding preyails oyer an implie(l onC'. (See Centmlll. Imp. Co. v. Memorial Pa/·ks. Inc., 40 CaJ.\pp.2tl 591 [105 P.2d 596].)
It is not lIe('essary. however, to re\'el'se the in.inncti\'e provision in the ,indgnwnt, for correctly construed. nnder th"
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mIl' rl'qu11'Ing libl'ral ('onstriIction to support it, there. is
no inconsistency. So interpreted, it enjoins only the maintenance in the futme by defendant on his land of additional
loose soil, that is, in addition to what is already there. The
findings nre readily susceptible of that construction. It is
found that "Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent restraining
order against the defendant, enjoining . . . defendant . . .
from excavating, rl'-slIrfacing or distrib'tding his said land
and depositing loose dirt in any manner which may threaten
or endanger the residenl'e of the plaintiff, and ordering the
defendant . . . to rl'move deposits of loose dirt upon his
said land, or ill lieu thereof, to place protecting structures
around said loose dirt in such a manner that the property
of the plaintiff will not be endangered or threatened by the
existence of deposits of loose dirt." (Italics added.) . It
,vill be noted that the participle form of the verbs "excavate,
re-surface or distribute" speak in the future. It could not
be speaking of the past because that soil had already been
f'xcayated and distributed. The removal of the dirt being
in the same tenor, refers to t.he dirt to be distributed in \he
future, after the entry of the judgment. It is true that
the judgment also refers to the removal of dirt theretofore
deposited. That portion of the judgment is out of harmony
with the findings and should he modified.
I would therefore modify the judgment with respect. to
injunctive relit'f against dirt already deposited on defendant's land and affirm the judgment as so modified.
The opinion and jUdgment were modified to read as above
printed and respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied
February 14, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.
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